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ADEQUACY OF CURRENT SUCCESSION LAW IN 
LIGHT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Benton Becker* 
 
I was pleased and honored to have the opportunity, in 1973, to represent 
then-Congressman Gerald R. Ford at his confirmation hearings for the 
Office of Vice President of the United States.  Those were difficult and 
trying times, as some of us in this room are old enough to remember.  The 
country was deeply split with respect to the Vietnam War, and there was 
constant talk of the impeachment of the President, Richard M. Nixon.  With 
each day, a new revelation occurred that threw more coals on that fire to 
impeach President Nixon.  It was in that environment of divisiveness in this 
country that Spiro T. Agnew, Nixon’s Vice President, on October 10, 1973, 
resigned from office.1 
His resignation was not, like John C. Calhoun’s as Vice President, a 
voluntary one.2  Agnew’s resignation was virtually an agreed-upon 
condition as a plea negotiation with respect to his entry of a nolo 
contendere plea to bribery charges, negotiated by the Department of Justice. 
Shortly thereafter, President Nixon nominated the House Minority 
Leader, Gerald Ford, to his position.  Then-Congressman Ford had been 
under consideration by President Nixon in 1968 at the convention as a 
running mate, but Nixon chose Agnew instead.  In 1973, Gerald Ford was 
the first person ever designated under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to 
serve in the Office of Vice President and to fill the vacancy that existed 
there. 
The Amendment was at that time, in 1973, about five years old.  There 
were no procedures.  There were no standards.  There were no rules.  We 
only knew what the Twenty-Fifth Amendment told us.  The Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment told us that he had to be confirmed by a majority of the Senate, 
and, for the very first time in American history, the first time in the 
Constitution or in any statute, the House of Representatives got into the 
 
* Counsel to Gerald R. Ford during the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Vice Presidential 
Confirmation Hearings.  This Article is adapted from Professor Becker’s remarks at the 
Fordham University School of Law Symposium, The Adequacy of the Presidential 
Succession System in the 21st Century, April 16-17, 2010. 
 1. James M. Naughton, Agnew Quits Vice Presidency and Admits Tax Evasion in ’67; 
Nixon Consults on Successor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1973, at 1. 
 2. Id. (reporting that in 1832, Vice President “John C. Calhoun stepped down after he 
was chosen to fill a Senate seat from South Carolina”).  
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confirmation act as well.  Following the Senate confirmation, there had to 
be a confirmation by the House.3 
We did not know what committee we were going to appear before at the 
Senate or the House.  We did not know if the Senate was first or the House 
was first.  We did not know whether the votes were going to be taken on the 
same day or were going to be done separately.  Very little had been 
implemented. 
What we did know was that we had a Congressman who had served 
eleven terms and had been in the House for twenty-three years.  We knew 
that, given the times and the tenor of the times in Washington at that point 
and throughout the nation, the scope of the inquiry of Congressman Ford 
would be far beyond the scope of the inquiry of any Cabinet member or 
Article III judge’s confirmation procedure.  It would be far, far more 
detailed, because there were many people in Washington in September of 
1973 who believed that this nominee was going to be President, one way or 
another.  Sooner or later, Richard Nixon was going to resign or be 
impeached.  And each day’s revelation seemed to support that premise. 
Consequently, there was a very serious effort to undertake a 
congressional background check of the man, Gerald Ford, who represented 
the Fifth District of Michigan for twenty-three years.  The congressional 
background check included an immediate designation of seventy-two—
count them, seventy-two—FBI agents working full-time on the background 
of this man. 
Furthermore, every vote, every contribution, every matter that this man 
had ever been involved with over that twenty-three year career in the House 
became grist for the mill.  The Bureau investigated all of these matters in 
detail. 
I was quickly informed, shortly after the nomination, that the Senate 
rules, which would be followed by the House as well, provided that counsel 
for Congressman Ford and Congressman Ford himself, would not have an 
opportunity to read, inspect, challenge, or have any access whatsoever to 
the FBI reports.  Those reports, in their raw form, would be given to the 
chairperson of the Senate committee and the House committee that were 
undertaking the confirmation proceedings.  Only the chair would get them, 
not the members of the committee and not the nominee. 
We were never given, although we asked for it in both bodies, a list of 
witnesses that the committee might bring.  We were able to get them 
informally, through minority members of the committee in the Senate.  For 
example, Senator Bob Griffin of Michigan was extremely helpful to us in 
helping us prepare for the confirmation proceedings before the Senate, 
which were to occur first. 
Let me say clearly that Gerald Ford was a Boy Scout all of his life.  He 
was a fine man, and there was really nothing there that could be injurious to 
Gerald Ford.  But I kept remembering back to a public statement that 
Jimmy Hoffa once made when Bobby Kennedy had such a targeted 
 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
2010] REMARKS OF BENTON BECKER 899 
investigation on everything that Jimmy Hoffa did.  Hoffa implied that 
nobody could withstand this kind of scrutiny. 
I will tell you, Gerald Ford had ten times the scrutiny that Jimmy Hoffa 
ever had by these committees. 
The Senate undertook a complete audit of the last ten years of 
Congressman Ford’s finances and undertook to question and explore his 
background and his competency for the Office of Vice President in what I 
considered to be a very professional way and a very thoughtful way and a 
very courteous way—nothing more than I would have expected from the 
United States Senate in 1973. 
To the young people present, it may sound like I am talking about a 
different planet or a different nation, when one looks at the partisanship that 
exists in Washington today.  That did not exist with the Ford confirmation 
proceedings in the United States Senate. 
There was a book on the bookstands at that time written by some lobbyist 
named Robert Winter-Berger.4  The book, a very trashy book, made 
references to members of Congress that Mr. Winter-Berger had allegedly 
(or imaginatively) given money to over the years.  The book was replete 
with factual errors.  Two of the members of Congress that Mr. Winter-
Berger claimed he gave money to had died two years before the alleged 
payment.  There was a reference to a date when Mr. Winter-Berger claimed 
to have met with Congressman Ford in Congressman Ford’s Washington 
office; however, to Mr. Winter-Berger’s embarrassment, Congressman Ford 
was not in Washington on that date.5 
We wanted to rid the issue of Winter-Berger at the Senate, before the 
House undertook confirmation.  The way we did that was, we asked for the 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses that were brought by the Senate 
committee.  We were denied that.  So we went back to our second source, 
Bob Griffin.  Senator Griffin from Michigan was very helpful.  We 
provided questions for Senator Griffin when Mr. Winter-Berger appeared. 
Mr. Winter-Berger appeared before that Committee and testified for 
probably two and a half or three hours.  At the conclusion of the 
Committee’s report, the committee transcribed Mr. Winter-Berger’s 
testimony, and sent it to the Department of Justice with the 
recommendation that the Department of Justice take a hard look at it and 
consider whether or not perjury had been committed before the 
Committee.6 
We were satisfied that Mr. Winter-Berger’s testimony demonstrated that 
he was devoid of credibility. 
 
 4. ROBERT N. WINTER-BERGER, THE GERALD FORD LETTERS (1974). 
 5. See generally id. 
 6. JAMES A. CANNON, TIME AND CHANCE:  GERALD FORD’S APPOINTMENT WITH 
HISTORY 242 (1994); J.Y. Smith & Lou Cannon, Gerald R. Ford, 93, Dies; Led in 
Watergate’s Wake, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2006, at A1.  
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Congressman Ford testified for approximately seven or eight hours 
before the Committee.7 
Prior to and during the Senate confirmation hearings, I became aware of 
activity by the Executive Branch and the Nixon White House.  White House 
Chief of Staff Al Haig knew that FBI reports were not being given to the 
nominee.  He was aware that the rules that had been established by both 
Houses provided that the FBI reports would not be given to the nominee nor 
could the nominee view the contents of the reports directly or indirectly 
through any backdoor.  Yet that did not prevent General Haig, who was 
Nixon’s Chief of Staff, from trying to surreptitiously deliver information to 
Congressman Ford regarding what the FBI was doing, what they found, and 
so forth.  I discovered that surreptitious and self-serving effort by General 
Haig and took immediate action.  Approximately two weeks prior to Mr. 
Ford’s appearance before the Senate Committee, I was present with him in 
his congressional office preparing him for his Senate committee testimony.  
Our work was interrupted by a secretary’s announcement that “General 
Haig was on the phone for Congressman Ford.”  Mr. Ford had listened to 
General Haig, who commenced to relate the content of the FBI vice 
presidential confirmation reports to the Congressman.  With Congressman 
Ford’s consent, I took the phone, interrupted the conversation, and as firmly 
as I could, instructed General Haig to cease transmitting any such 
information to Congressman Ford.  I further informed the General that “we 
would handle the confirmation, and we did not want or need White House 
assistance.” 
Let me give you an idea of the depth of the FBI inquiry into Mr. Ford’s 
background.  This was 1973.  In the early 1940s, Gerald Ford played 
football for the University of Michigan.  He played sixty minutes.  He was 
the center and he was a linebacker.  Against Ohio State, in his third year, 
linebacker Gerald Ford was called for a penalty of unnecessary roughness 
when tackling an Ohio State halfback. 
Listen to this.  More than thirty-three years later, in 1973, two FBI agents 
found that halfback and asked him this question, “What unnecessary 
roughness did linebacker Ford do?” 
The halfback called the Congressman’s office and, quite highly amused, 
told us of his silly encounter with the FBI.  He thought it was amusing that 
he would be interviewed by the FBI (incidentally, he volunteered that the 
tackle was a “clean hit”).  The FBI left no stone unturned, none at all. 
The Senate committee, of course, voted favorably, the recommendation 
to confirm.8  The Senate voted favorably.  Within three days, we were 
before a committee of the House of Representatives.9 
 
 7. See generally Marjorie Hunter, Ford Is Approved by Senate, 92–3; House Set To 
Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1973, at 1.  
 8. Id. 
 9. See Marjorie Hunter, Ford Sworn as Vice President After House Approves, 387–35, 
He Vows Equal Justice for All, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1973, at 1. See generally 119 CONG. REC. 
39807–900 (1973); ANDREW DOWNER CRAIN, THE FORD PRESIDENCY:  A HISTORY (2009). 
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I never did find an adequate explanation for the House Committee 
assignment, but I will simply tell you the bottom line.  The bottom line, 
despite numerous standing and special committees of the House to choose 
from, Ford’s confirmation was assigned to the Judiciary Committee, which 
was at that very time entertaining three impeachment resolutions against the 
man who had nominated Ford for Vice President.  It was a far more hostile 
audience than the Senate committee.  Of course, it was a larger Committee 
in terms of the number of members.  Consequently, the number of 
questioning minutes Committee members were afforded was shorter than 
that of the Senate committee.10 
But at times it seemed that the House committee was not a committee of 
the Federal Legislature, but it more closely resembled a political convention 
of ambitious politicians.  Members were making speeches about Richard 
Nixon and adding to their end of their speech, “Now, if you were President, 
would you do that, Congressman Ford?” or “What do you think about 
that?” and trying to get Congressman Ford to speak about Nixon and to 
stoke the fires of divisiveness.  Several of the Committee members were not 
seeking factual and truthful information about the Congressman and/or his 
nomination.11  I do not include all of the Committee members, but many of 
them appeared to me as such. 
For example, Congressman John Conyers, who is now, as we speak 
today, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, was a member of 
that committee in 1973.  As the committee questioning went around the 
room—“you’re next,” “you’re next,” “you’re next”—each time it got 
around to Congressman Conyers, he made the same remarks and comments.  
He said, in essence, “I can’t ask any questions of you, Congressman, 
because I was denied the FBI reports.”  Only the Chairman has the FBI 
reports, and the Chairman will not share them with the other members.12  
Congressman Ford advised that he was in the same predicament, i.e. 
without FBI reports, and simply offered to answer any questions Committee 
members may have. 
Conversely, Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, from New York, took 
exactly the opposite tack, saying in essence, “I’m only given X number of 
minutes.  I don’t have time for you to answer all of my questions, so let me 
just tell you what my questions are.”  Thereupon she read a number of 
questions not seeking, because of time restrictions, any answers.13   We 
would always ask the Congresswoman for her questions and submit written 
answers within days.  Just questions, questions, questions, and no answers.  
Many of the questions implied serious deficiencies with respect to the 
 
 10. See generally 119 CONG. REC. at 39807–900. 
 11. See generally id. 
 12. See generally id. at 39825–34. 
 13. See id. at 39809–12. 
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character, dignity, and qualifications of Congressman Ford.14  Nonetheless, 
I believe, we conducted ourselves as gentlemen. 
There was a member from California named Jerome Waldie, who was 
blatantly running for the Democratic Party nomination for Governor of 
California.  He saw the Ford confirmation procedures by the House 
Committee as an opportunity to gain some notoriety and ink in California.  
His questions directed at Mr. Ford were calculated to enhance his candidacy 
with, in my opinion, little interest in exploring the candidate’s 
qualifications.  Congressman’s Waldie’s Committee behavior, I remember 
telling Mr. Ford, demonstrated the wisdom of our Founding Fathers who 
wrote the Constitution, and specifically excluded the House of 
Representatives from any confirmation consideration.  Many of Waldie’s 
questions pertained to Mr. Ford’s recommendation to the Judiciary 
Committee that it explore Justice William O. Douglas’s receipt of 
compensation for service on boards of directors while he was a member of 
the Supreme Court.15 
My goodness gracious, you would think that Congressman Ford had 
asked for the moon or was accusing someone or even trying to impeach 
someone.  Never was that his intent.  His intent was merely to investigate 
compensation received by Justice Douglas and Article III judges.  Wrongly, 
Mr. Waldie’s questions on this subject inferred a sinister motive by 
Congressman Ford. 
The Judiciary Committee, after going through many, many sessions, 
concluded its work with a favorable majority vote.  The full House voted 
overwhelmingly in favor of confirmation.16 
On December 6, 1973, Congressman Ford was sworn in as the Vice 
President of the United States, under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.17 
Let me add a word or two, because the story does not end there.  These 
were harsh times for our nation and our Constitution.  In December 1973, 
when Gerald Ford became the Vice President of the United States, the 
media focus was on Watergate, Richard Nixon, the people in the Nixon 
White House, the Special Prosecutor indictments, the White House tape 
revelations, and the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment inquiry, 
resulting in even greater divisiveness in the nation.  It was a very, very 
heated time.  It is in that environment, on December 6, 1973, that Gerald 
Ford became the Vice President. 
There were people in high positions in the Nixon White House who 
honestly believed, and carried out their beliefs with their behavior, that Vice 
President Gerald Ford was nothing more than another middle-level 
executive branch officer, who could be told what to do.  And punished 
 
 14. See generally id. at 39807–900. See also Gerald R. Ford Biography, GERALD R. 
FORD PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://www.ford.utexas.edu/grf/fordbiop.asp (last 
updated Feb. 5, 2008). 
 15. See generally  39820–21.  
 16. See Marjorie Hunter, Ford Sworn as Vice President After House Approves, 387–35; 
He Vows Equal Justice for All, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1973, at 1. 
 17. See id. 
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severely for failure to behave as told.  As a consequence, key members of 
the Nixon White House undertook to take advantage of Vice President 
Ford’s good nature and of his general disposition, practiced throughout his 
political life, to be a good team player.  These individuals took advantage of 
the Vice President’s characteristics, by among other ways, scheduling him 
for speeches around the nation without his prior approval.  They would send 
him memos that read, “You have been scheduled to speak in Kansas on 
such-and-such a day and in Alabama on another such day, before such-and-
such group.  The White House staff will write your speech.” 
The Vice President’s office was located in the Executive Office Building, 
next door to the White House.  The Washington political culture at that time 
held that the closer your office was to the office of the President, the greater 
your influence.  Conversely, the farther away your office was to the office 
of the President, the less your influence.  Vice President Ford visited the 
Nixon White House by invitation, not by vocation. 
Those speeches that were prepared by the White House staff never 
arrived early.  Most often they never arrived before the Vice President 
boarded the Air Force II to go to the speech location.  Sometimes the 
speech draft did not arrive even after the Vice President landed.  On a few 
occasions, the Vice President was already seated at the event head table 
when he was handed, for the first time, a draft of the speech he was 
scheduled to make. 
I can only tell you that many of the Nixon White House staff prepared 
speeches for the Vice President that were Agnew-like, blind defenses of 
Nixon and the Nixon White House. 
But Gerald Ford was, for the first two to three months, unwilling to 
confront that issue.  His team-player nature continued to control. 
I had a session with him sometime in early March or early April of 1974.  
Very clearly, I let him know that he held the only position in the White 
House that Richard Nixon could not fire.  Of course, he knew that, but he 
had not fully realized that he had been cast in an Agnew role, blindly 
defending the President. 
Furthermore, as it became clear—more and more daily—Richard Nixon 
was either going to resign or be impeached.  That truism forced the 
recognition that, “Someday you are going to be President.  You are not 
going to be President of Richard Nixon’s constituency.  You are going to be 
President of the United States, and the people in the United States have to 
accept you as their President, not Richard Nixon’s replacement.  Your 
honesty and your candor have to be brought forth to the people.  That will 
not happen if you allow the Nixon White House to manipulate you with 
these speeches.” 
In true Gerald Ford fashion, he immediately understood, he was 
sympathetic to it, and he went beyond what I recommended.  I 
recommended no more speeches by the White House staff.  Further, the 
Vice President would not commit in advance unless his office wrote the 
speech. 
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But beyond that, in the month of May of 1974, Gerald Ford attended a 
Cabinet meeting.  This coincided, as I recollect, with the revelation of the 
smoking-gun White House tape of March of 1972.18 
Vice President Ford attended a Cabinet meeting and, at the Cabinet 
meeting, requested and received permission to make an off-the-agenda 
remark and announced to President Nixon—in the presence of the 
Cabinet—that he could no longer and would no longer publicly support this 
administration or this President in its public comments regarding the 
Watergate matter. 
This was an act of great courage and guts.  I always thought that the Vice 
President’s statement, among other acts that he did, including the pardon of 
Richard Nixon, represented great demonstration of political courage on his 
part.  In his retirement, we spoke frequently and visited frequently.  He was 
most proud of so many of the offices and awards that he had received over 
the years.  But the one that pleased him the most was the award that Senator 
Ted Kennedy and Caroline Kennedy presented to him:  the Kennedy Family 
Profiles in Courage Award.19  This award represented the political courage 
demonstrated by President Ford during his Presidency.  Although the award 
was specifically focused on President Ford’s pardon grant to Richard 
Nixon, I always believed that President Ford’s Cabinet announcement of no 
longer defending the Nixon White House was equally politically 
courageous. 
In response to the question of whether there is a conflict of interest with 
legislative succession, let me respond briefly to that and tell you that when 
Congressman Ford was being confirmed, the Speaker of the House, Carl 
Albert, was second in line, from the moment of Agnew’s resignation, and 
would remain the second in line until such time as someone occupied the 
Vice Presidency and President Ford was confirmed. 
We were concerned initially about the possibility of some future 
Speaker—not necessarily Carl Albert, but any Speaker—who might want to 
become President and might see an opportunity to advance his or her 
position to the White House by simply delaying and delaying and 
frustrating, and possibly even denying confirmation to a vice presidential 
designee or Vice President nominee.  It was a serious concern.  If you had, 
theoretically, a Newt Gingrich who wanted to be President, who 
theoretically had the authority and the power to withhold confirmation out 
of the House, withhold the Committee hearings, control the vote on the 
floor in such a way as to stretch out and lengthen that process until maybe 
 
 18. For information on the White House tapes, see White House Tapes, NIXON 
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://nixon.archives.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/
index.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). 
 19. Jeff Jacoby, Commentary:  Ford’s Act of Clemency – Americas – International 
Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/27/
world/americas/27iht-web.1227ford.globe.4027875.html; News Release, Special One Hour 
Documentary “Profiles in Courage:  A Kennedy Legacy” To Be Broadcast Nationally on 
August 26, on NBC Stations, JOHN. F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (Aug. 17, 
2006), http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK+Library+and+Museum/News+and+Press/Profiles+in+
Courage+A+Kennedy+Legacy+to+Air+on+NBC+Stations.htm.  
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the President is impeached or resigned—you might have such an ambitious 
person sometime in the future. 
Let me make it very clear that that was not the case in 1974.  The case in 
1974 was that Carl Albert was very anxious to move down the succession 
ladder from number two to number three.  He was very cooperative at every 
step of the way in moving the nomination forward.  But we had an initial 
concern on that score. 
In 1974, when President Ford was confirmed, Washington and the 
Congress were different from today.  Who among us today, in 2010, does 
not recognize the partisanship and the divisive nature of the Congress of the 
United States has changed considerably in that forty or fifty-year period?  
Without reflecting on the present Speaker, it would seem to me a far greater 
likelihood for pure partisanship controlling an unfavorable and unfair result 
by delaying the nomination.  In the present atmosphere there exists in 
Washington partisanship that did not exist in 1974 with President Ford. 
 
